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Abstract
We refute the conjecture that all negative translations are intuitionistically
equivalent by giving two counterexamples. Then we characterise the negative
translations intuitionistically equivalent to the usual ones.
1 Introduction
Informally speaking, classical logic CL is the usual logic in mathematics, and intu-
itionistic logic IL is obtained from classical logic by omitting:
• reductio ad absurdum
¬A
˙˙˙
⊥
A
;
• law of excluded middle A ∨ ¬A;
• law of double negation ¬¬A→ A.
In this sense, IL is a weakening of CL, that is IL proves less theorems than CL.
At first sight it seems that IL is just poorer than CL. However, there is a gain in
moving from CL to IL: the theorems of IL have nicer properties. The main properties
gained are
• disjunction property: if IL ⊢ A ∨B, then IL ⊢ A or IL ⊢ B
(where A and B are sentences);
• existence property: if IL ⊢ ∃xA(x), then IL ⊢ A(t) for some term t
(where ∃xA is a sentence).
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Arguably, these two properties are the key criteria to say that a logic is constructive.
On the one hand IL is weaker than CL, on the other hand IL is constructive
while CL is not. Given these differences, it is surprising that CL can be faithfully
embedded in IL by the so-called negative translations into IL. Negative translations
into IL are functions N , mapping a formula A to a formula AN , that:
• embed CL into IL, that is CL ⊢ A ⇒ IL ⊢ AN ;
• are faithful, that is CL ⊢ AN ↔ A.
The image of the usual negative translations is (essentially) the negative fragment
NF, that is the set of all formulas without ∨ and ∃ and whose atomic formulas are
all negated. So NF is a faithful copy of CL inside IL. This is pictured in figure 1.
CL
CL IL
NF
N
Figure 1: negative translation N into IL embedding CL in the fragment NF of IL.
There are four negative translations into IL usually found in the literature (and
recently two new ones were presented [5]). They are introduced in table 1 and
defined (by induction on the structure of formulas) in table 2. All these negative
translations into IL are equivalent in IL: given any two of them, say M and N , we
have IL ⊢ AM ↔ AN . This fact leads to the following conjecture that seems to be
almost folklore:
if we rigorously define the notion of a negative translation into IL, then
we should be able to prove that all negative translations are equivalent
in IL.
Curiously, this conjecture apparently has never been studied before. In this article
we study it, reaching the following conclusions.
• The conjecture is false and we give two counterexamples.
• The usual negative translations into IL are characterised by the following two
equivalent conditions:
– to translate into NF in IL, that is AN is equivalent in IL to a formula in
NF;
– to act as the identity on NF in IL, that is IL ⊢ AN ↔ A for all A ∈ NF.
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Year Name Symbol Note
1925 Kolmogorov [14] Ko
1933 Go¨del-Gentzen G
One variant by Go¨del [11] and another
one independently by Gentzen [8]
1951 Kuroda [16] Ku
1998 Krivine [15] Kr
Maybe better attributed to Streicher
and Reus [17]
Table 1: the four usual negative translations.
PKo :≡ ¬¬P (P 6≡ ⊥ atomic) PG :≡ ¬¬P (P 6≡ ⊥ atomic)
⊥Ko :≡ ⊥ ⊥G :≡ ⊥
(A ∧ B)Ko :≡ ¬¬(AKo ∧BKo) (A ∧B)G :≡ AG ∧BG
(A ∨ B)Ko :≡ ¬¬(AKo ∨BKo) (A ∨B)G :≡ ¬(¬AG ∧ ¬BG)
(A→ B)Ko :≡ ¬¬(AKo → BKo) (A→ B)G :≡ AG → BG
(∀xA)Ko :≡ ¬¬∀xAKo (∀xA)G :≡ ∀xAG
(∃xA)Ko :≡ ¬¬∃xAKo (∃xA)G :≡ ¬∀x¬AG
AKu :≡ ¬¬AKu A
Kr :≡ ¬AKr
PKu :≡ P (P atomic) PKr :≡ ¬P (P atomic)
(A ∧B)Ku :≡ AKu ∧ BKu (A ∧B)Kr :≡ AKr ∨BKr
(A ∨B)Ku :≡ AKu ∨ BKu (A ∨B)Kr :≡ AKr ∧BKr
(A→ B)Ku :≡ AKu → BKu (A→ B)Kr :≡ ¬AKr ∧ BKr
(∀xA)Ku :≡ ∀x¬¬AKu (∀xA)Kr :≡ ∃xAKr
(∃xA)Ku :≡ ∃xAKu (∃xA)Kr :≡ ¬∃x¬AKr
Table 2: definition of the four usual negative translations.
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2 Notions
In the rest of this article, CL denotes the pure first order classical predicate logic
based on ⊥, ∧, ∨,→, ∀ and ∃ (where ¬A :≡ A→ ⊥, A↔ B :≡ (A→ B)∧(B → A)
and ≡ denotes syntactical equality) and IL and ML denote its intuitionistic and
minimal counterparts, respectively. All formulas considered belong to the common
language of CL, IL and ML. To save parentheses we adopt the convention that ∀ and
∃ bind stronger than ∧ and ∨, which in turn bind stronger than →.
Let us start by motivating our definition of a negative translation.
The main feature of any negative translation N into IL is embedding CL into
IL in the sense of CL ⊢ A ⇒ IL ⊢ AN . We can be even more ambitious and
ask for (1) CL + Γ ⊢ A ⇒ IL + ΓN ⊢ AN where Γ is any set of formulas and
ΓN := {AN : A ∈ Γ}.
But embedding CL into IL alone does not seem to capture our intuitive notion of
a negative translation. For example, it includes the trivial example AN :≡ ¬⊥. The
problem with this example is that the meaning of AN is unrelated to the meaning
of A. So require that a negative translation do not change the meaning of formulas,
that is (2) AN ↔ A. This equivalence must not be taken in IL or ML, otherwise
from (1) and (2) we would get CL = IL. So we take the equivalence in CL, that is
CL ⊢ A↔ AN .
Definition 1. Let N be a function mapping each formula A to a formula AN .
• The following condition is called soundness theorem into IL (ML) of N : for all
formulas A and for all sets Γ of possibly open formulas, we have the implication
CL+Γ ⊢ A ⇒ IL+ΓN ⊢ AN (respectively, CL+Γ ⊢ A ⇒ ML+ΓN ⊢ AN).
• The following condition is called characterisation theorem of N : for all formu-
las A we have CL ⊢ AN ↔ A.
• We say that N is a negative translation into IL (ML) if and only if both the
soundness theorem into IL (respectively, ML) of N and the characterisation
theorem of N hold.
Remark 2. The soundness theorem into ML of N implies the soundness theorem into
IL of N . So a negative translation into ML is in particular a negative translation
into IL.
The conjecture that concerns us mentions equivalence in IL. For definiteness, we
write down exactly what we mean by this.
Definition 3. We say that two negative translations M and N are equivalent in
IL (ML) if and only if for all formulas A we have IL ⊢ AM ↔ AN (respectively,
ML ⊢ AM ↔ AN ).
Later on we will see that what characterises the usual negative translations into IL
are two properties related to NF. Again for definiteness we write down the definition
of NF and of the two properties.
Definition 4. The negative fragment NF is the set of formulas inductively generated
by:
4
• ⊥ ∈ NF;
• if P is an atomic formula, then ¬P ∈ NF;
• if A,B ∈ NF, then A ∧B,A→ B, ∀xA ∈ NF.
Definition 5. Let N be a negative translation into IL.
• We say that N translates into NF in IL (ML) if and only if for all formulas A
there exists a B ∈ NF such that IL ⊢ AN ↔ B (respectively, ML ⊢ AN ↔ B).
• We say that N acts as the identity on NF in IL (ML) if and only if for all
A ∈ NF we have IL ⊢ AN ↔ A (respectively, ML ⊢ AN ↔ A).
3 Go¨del-Gentzen negative translation
We will choose the Go¨del-Gentzen negative translation G as a representative of the
usual negative translations into IL, so let us take a closer look at it.
We start by motivating the definition of G. It is known from proof theory that
CL is conservative over ML with respect to NF, that is (1) for all A ∈ NF we have
the implication CL ⊢ A ⇒ ML ⊢ A. This suggests us that one way of constructing
a negative translation into ML is to rewrite each formula A as a formula AN ∈ NF.
By rewriting we mean that AN still has the same meaning as A in the sense of
(2) CL ⊢ AN ↔ A. Then (1) would give us the soundness theorem into ML of N
(almost, because there is no Γ) and (2) would give us the characterisation theorem
of N . The natural way of rewriting a formula A as a classically equivalent formula
AN ∈ NF (that is having all atomic formulas P 6≡ ⊥ negated and using only ⊥, ∧,
→ and ∀) is:
• rewrite atomic formulas P 6≡ ⊥ as ¬¬P ;
• rewrite A ∨ B as ¬(¬A ∧ ¬B);
• rewrite ∃xA as ¬∀x¬A;
• there’s no need to rewrite ⊥, A ∧B, A→ B and ∀xA.
If we formalise these rewritings as a definition of N by induction on the structure
of formulas, then we get exactly G. As a “tagline” we can say: AG is the natural
rewriting of A into NF.
Incidentally, Go¨del’s and Gentzen’s negative translations differ only in the way
they translate A → B: Go¨del translates to ¬(AG ∧ ¬BG) while Gentzen translates
to AG → BG. By the above discussion, we find Gentzen’s variant more natural and
so we adopt it.
Now we turn to the main properties of G. We can prove that G:
• is a negative translation into ML;
• translates into NF in ML;
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• acts as the identity on NF in ML.
We can even prove strengthenings of the second and third properties above:
• for all formulas A we have AG ∈ NF;
• for all formulas A ∈ NF we have AG ≡ A
(modulo identifying ¬¬¬P with ¬P for atomic formulas P ).
These two strengthenings are specific of G: they do not hold for Ko, Ku and Kr .
To finish this section we discuss G as a representative of the usual negative
translations into IL. We can prove that Ko, G, Ku and Kr are equivalent in IL. So
any of them can be taken as a representative of the usual negative translations into
IL. We choose to take G as a representative due to nice syntactical properties of G
like (A ↔ B)G ≡ AG ↔ BG and the two strengthenings above. These properties
allow us to work many times with syntactical equalities instead of equivalences, thus
avoiding the question of where (CL, IL or ML) the equivalences are provable.
4 Two negative translations not intuitionistically
equivalent to the usual ones
Before we present our two counterexamples to the conjecture, let us draw a scale
to roughly measure how provable or refutable a formula F is. This scale will be
useful to picture our main theorem about the counterexamples. We draw the scale
following this set of instructions.
• We plot along an axis all possible pairs of combinations of
CL ⊢ F, CL 0 F and CL 0 ¬F, CL ⊢ ¬F
with
IL ⊢ F, IL 0 F and IL 0 ¬F, IL ⊢ ¬F.
• Actually, we do not plot impossible pairs (for example, “CL ⊢ F and IL ⊢ ¬F”)
and redundant entries in pairs (for example, the entry “CL ⊢ F” in the pair
“CL ⊢ F and IL ⊢ F”).
• The plotting is ordered from provability of F on the left to refutability of F
on the right (for example, “IL ⊢ F” stands on the left of “CL ⊢ F and IL 0 F”
because “IL ⊢ F” states a stronger form of provability).
The resulting scale is pictured in figure 2.
Now we present our two counterexamples.
• The first counterexample N1 is a weakening of G obtained by weakening A
G
to AG ∨ F (for suitable formulas F ).
• The second counterexample N2 is a variant of G obtained by making ⊥ in A
G
“less false” in the sense of replacing ⊥ by F in AG, that is AG[F/⊥] (again,
for suitable F ).
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•
IL⊢F
strongly
provable
•
CL⊢F
IL0F
provable
(but not strongly)
•
CL0F
CL0¬F
undecidable
•
CL⊢¬F
IL0¬F
refutable
(but not strongly)
•
IL⊢¬F
strongly
refutable
Figure 2: scale of provability-refutability.
Definition 6. Fix a formula F . We define two functions N1 and N2, mapping
formulas to formulas, by
• AN1 :≡ AG ∨ F ;
• AN2 :≡ AG[F/⊥].
Since N1 and N2 depend on the chosen F , in rigour we should write something
like AN1(F ) and AN2(F ), but we avoid this cumbersome notation.
We found N2 in an article by Ishihara [13] and in a book chapter by Coquand
[2, section 2.3]. Maybe Ishihara drew inspiration from an article by Flagg and
Friedman [6] where a similar translation appears. It is even possible that N2 is
folklore.
For our two counterexamples to work, we need the formula F to be classically
refutable but intuitionistically acceptable. In the next lemma we prove that there
are such formulas F .
Lemma 7.
1. There exists a formula F such that CL ⊢ ¬F but IL 0 ¬F .
2. Any such formula F is not equivalent in IL to a formula in NF.
Proof.
1. Let P be an unary predicate symbol. We are going to prove that F ≡
¬∀xP (x) ∧ ∀x¬¬P (x) is such that CL ⊢ ¬F but IL 0 ¬F . Since CL ⊢ ¬F is
obvious, we move on to prove IL 0 ¬F by showing that the Kripke model K
from figure 3 forces F .
• K forces ¬∀xP (x) because no node forces ∀xP (x).
• K forces ∀x¬¬P (x) because every node k forces ¬¬P (d) for all d in its
domain {0, . . . , k} since the node k + 1 forces P (d).
2. If F were equivalent in IL to a formula in NF, then ¬F would also be equivalent
in IL to a formula in NF, so from CL ⊢ ¬F and the fact that CL is conservative
over IL with respect to NF we would get IL ⊢ ¬F , contradicting point 1.
Now we prove our main theorem giving two counterexamples to the conjecture:
N1 and N2 are negative translations into IL (even into ML) not equivalent in IL to
the usual negative translations into IL (for suitable formulas F ). The claims of this
theorem are summarised in figure 4.
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...
•{0, 1, 2, 3} 3 P (0), P (1), P (2)
•{0, 1, 2} 2 P (0), P (1)
•{0, 1} 1 P (0)
•{0} 0
Figure 3: a Kripke model K forcing ¬∀xP (x) ∧ ∀x¬¬P (x).
Theorem 8. The functions N1 and N2:
1. have a soundness theorem into ML for all formulas F ;
2. have a characterisation theorem if and only if CL ⊢ ¬F ;
3. are equivalent in IL to G if and only if IL ⊢ ¬F .
So, if CL ⊢ ¬F but IL 0 ¬F , then N1 and N2 are negative translations into ML not
equivalent in IL to G.
•
strongly
provable
IL⊢F
•
provable
(but not strongly)
CL⊢F
IL0F
•
undecidable
CL0F
CL0¬F
•
refutable
(but not strongly)
CL⊢¬F
IL0¬F
IL0AN1↔AG
IL0AN2↔AG
•
strongly
refutable
IL⊢¬F
IL⊢AN1↔AG
IL⊢AN2↔AG

soundness

characterisation
Figure 4: theorem 8 on the scale of provability-refutability.
Proof.
1. Consider an arbitrary formula F .
First let us consider the case of N1. By direct proof, consider an arbitrary set
of formulas Γ and an arbitrary formula A, assume CL+Γ ⊢ A and let us prove
ML + ΓN1 ⊢ AN1 . Since a proof in CL of A uses only finitely many formulas
A1, . . . , An from Γ, then CL + A1 + · · ·+ An ⊢ A. By the soundness theorem
into ML of G we get ML+AG1 + · · ·+A
G
n ⊢ A
G (where AGi abbreviates (Ai)
G),
that is (1) ML ⊢ AG1 ∧ · · · ∧ A
G
n
→ AG by the deduction theorem of ML.
Let us show (2) ML+AG1 ∨ F + · · ·+A
G
n
∨ F ⊢ AG ∨ F . We argue inside ML.
Assume AG1 ∨ F, . . . , A
G
n ∨ F . Each A
G
i ∨ F gives us two cases: the case of A
G
i
and the case of F .
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• If for some AG
i
∨ F we have the case F , then trivially AG ∨ F .
• Otherwise in all AG
i
∨F we have the case of AG
i
, so we have AG1 ∧· · ·∧A
G
n
,
thus AG by (1), therefore trivially AG ∨ F .
So we have (2) as we wanted. This argument is illustrated for n = 2 in figure
5.
AG1 ∧ A
G
2
// AG
AG2 ∨ F
AG
2 eeeeeeeeeeeee
F
YYYYY
YYYYY
YYY
AG1 ∧ F
// AG ∨ F
AG1 ∨ F
AG
1
lllllllllllll
F RRR
RRR
RRR
RRR
R
F ∧ AG2
// AG ∨ F
AG2 ∨ F
AG
2
eeeeeeeeeeeee
F
YYYYYY
YYYYYY
YY
F ∧ F // AG ∨ F
Figure 5: argument of ML+ AG1 ∨ F + · · ·+ A
G
n
∨ F ⊢ AG ∨ F for n = 2.
But (2) is ML + AN1 + · · · + AN1 ⊢ AN1, so we get ML + ΓN1 ⊢ AN1 , as we
wanted.
Now let us consider the case of N2. By direct proof, consider an arbitrary
set of formulas Γ and an arbitrary formula A, assume CL + Γ ⊢ A and let
us prove ML + ΓN2 ⊢ AN2 . By the soundness theorem into ML of G we get
ML + AG1 + · · · + A
G
n
⊢ AG. Since ⊥ is treated as an arbitrary propositional
letter in ML, we can replace ⊥ by F getting ML+AG1 [F/⊥]+ · · ·+A
G
n [F/⊥] ⊢
AG[F/⊥], that is ML+ AN21 + · · ·+ A
N2
n
⊢ AN2, as we wanted.
2. First let us consider the case of N1.
(⇒) By direct proof, assume that N1 has a characterisation theorem and let
us prove CL ⊢ ¬F . By the characterisation theorem of N1 we have
CL ⊢ ⊥N1 ↔ ⊥ where ⊥N1 ≡ ⊥ ∨ F , so CL ⊢ ¬F , as we wanted.
(⇐) By direct proof, assume CL ⊢ ¬F , consider an arbitrary formula A and
let us prove CL ⊢ AN1 ↔ A. By the characterisation theorem of G
we have CL ⊢ AG ↔ A. Since CL ⊢ ¬F by assumption, it makes no
difference in CL to replace AG by AG ∨ F . So CL ⊢ AG ∨ F ↔ A, that is
CL ⊢ AN1 ↔ A, as we wanted.
Now let us consider the case of N2.
(⇒) Analogous to the case of N1.
(⇐) By direct proof, assume CL ⊢ ¬F , consider an arbitrary formula A and let
us prove CL ⊢ AN2 ↔ A. By the characterisation theorem of G we have
CL ⊢ AG ↔ A. Since CL ⊢ ¬F by assumption, it makes no difference in
CL to replace ⊥ by F . So CL ⊢ AG[F/⊥] ↔ A, that is CL ⊢ AN2 ↔ A,
as we wanted.
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3. First let us consider the case of N1.
(⇒) By direct proof, assume that N1 and G are equivalent in IL and let us
prove IL ⊢ ¬F . By the assumption we have IL ⊢ ⊥N1 ↔ ⊥G where
⊥N1 ≡ ⊥ ∨ F and ⊥G ≡ ⊥. So IL ⊢ ¬F , as we wanted.
(⇐) By direct proof, assume IL ⊢ ¬F , take an arbitrary formula A and let us
prove IL ⊢ AN1 ↔ AG. By the assumption it makes no difference in IL to
replace AG by AG ∨ F . So IL ⊢ AG ∨ F ↔ AG, that is IL ⊢ AN1 ↔ AG,
as we wanted.
Now let us consider the case of N2.
(⇒) Analogously to the case of N1.
(⇐) By direct proof, assume IL ⊢ ¬F , take an arbitrary formula A and let us
prove IL ⊢ AN2 ↔ AG. By the assumption it makes no difference in IL to
replace ⊥ by F . So IL ⊢ AG[F/⊥] ↔ AG, that is IL ⊢ AN2 ↔ AG, as we
wanted.
We saw in theorem 8 that N1 and N2 are two counterexamples to the conjecture
(for suitable F ). Now in proposition 9 we clarify that these two counterexamples
are different (for the same suitable F ).
Proposition 9. If CL ⊢ ¬F but IL 0 ¬F , then N1 and N2 are not equivalent in IL.
Proof. By direct proof, assume that CL ⊢ ¬F but IL 0 ¬F and let us prove IL 0
AN1 ↔ AN2. We start by making two observations about Kripke models.
1. There exists a Kripke model K, with a bottom node, that forces ¬F .
Let us prove this claim. Since CL ⊢ ¬F by assumption, any classical model
forces ¬F . Regarding a classical model as a Kripke model with only one node,
we have a Kripke model, with a bottom node, forcing ¬F , as we wanted.
For example, for the F ≡ ¬∀xP (x) ∧ ∀x¬¬P (x) used in the proof of lemma
7, we can take K to be the Kripke model of figure 6.
•{0} P (0)
Figure 6: a Kripke model K forcing ¬F where F ≡ ¬∀xP (x) ∧ ∀x¬¬P (x).
2. There exists a Kripke model L, with a bottom node, that forces F .
Let us prove this claim. Since IL 0 ¬F by assumption, there exists a Kripke
model L′ that does not force ¬F , that is some node n′ of L′ does not force ¬F .
Then there exists a node n above or equal to n′ that forces F . By restricting
L′ to all the nodes above or equal to n we get a Kripke model L, with bottom
node n, that forces F , as we wanted.
For example, for the F ≡ ¬∀xP (x) ∧ ∀x¬¬P (x) used in the proof of lemma
7, we can take L to be the Kripke model of figure 3.
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Now let us return to our goal: IL 0 AN1 ↔ AN2 . Consider a fresh nullary
predicate Q 6≡ ⊥. Since Q is fresh and Q 6≡ ⊥,
• L forces ¬Q;
• we can force Q in K;
• forcing Q in K will not collide with K forcing ¬F .
We will show IL 0 QN2 → QN1 , where QN2 ≡ (Q → F ) → F and QN1 ≡ ¬¬Q ∨ F ,
by presenting a Kripke model not forcing (∗) ((Q→ F )→ F )→ ¬¬Q ∨ F .
The base nodes of K and L have (by definition of Kripke model) non empty
domains. We can assume (renaming elements if necessary) that those domains share
a common element d. Consider the Kripke model M from figure 7 obtained by:
• connecting a fresh bottom node 0, with domain {d}, to the bottom nodes of
K and L;
• for every node n of M, forcing Q in n if and only if n forces ¬F ;
or equivalently, forcing Q in K but not in L and 0.
•Q,¬F K •L F,¬Q
•{d} 0
?????????

Figure 7: a Kripke model M not forcing ((Q→ F )→ F )→ ¬¬Q ∨ F .
Note that M is well-defined because:
• the domains of M are monotone since {d} is contained in the domains of K
and L;
• the forcing relation in M is monotone since Q is forced only in the entire K.
Now we argue that M does not force (∗).
• The node 0 does not force ¬¬Q because L forces ¬Q.
• The node 0 does not force F because K forces ¬F .
• Let us show that the node 0 forces (Q → F ) → F , that is any node n does
not force Q→ F or forces F . We consider the following three cases.
– If n is in K, then n does not force Q → F because K forces Q (by
construction of M) and ¬F .
– If n is in L, then n forces F because L forces F .
– If n is 0, then n does not force Q→ F , otherwise K would force Q→ F
and we already saw that this is false.
We conclude that the node 0 does not force (∗), as we wanted.
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As a curiosity, let us see that we have the factorisations N2 = FD ◦ G and
N2 = FD
′ ◦ G of N2 in terms of Friedman-Dragalin translation FD [4, 7] (better
known as Friedman’s A-translation), its refinement FD ′ [1] and G. The translation
FD was used by Friedman and Dragalin to prove that certain intuitionistic theories
IT are closed under Markov rule in the sense of IT ⊢ ¬¬∃xP (x) ⇒ IT ⊢ ∃xP (x)
where P (x) is an atomic formula.
Definition 10. Fix a formula F .
• Friedman-Dragalin translation FD maps each formula A to the formula AFD
obtained from A by simultaneously replacing in A:
– ⊥ by F ;
– all atomic subformulas P 6≡ ⊥ by P ∨ F .
• The refined Friedman-Dragalin translation FD ′ maps each formula A to the
formula AFD
′
:≡ A[F/⊥].
Naming FD ′ a refinement of FD is a little bit misleading, as we explain now. On
the one hand, FD ′ simplifies FD by dropping the replacement of atomic subformulas
P 6≡ ⊥ by P ∨ F . On the other hand,
• FD is sound in the sense of IL ⊢ A ⇒ ML ⊢ AFD ;
• in general FD ′ is sound only in the weaker sense of ML ⊢ A ⇒ ML ⊢ AFD
′
.
So we can say that FD ′ only really refines FD on ML, not on IL. This limitation
of FD ′ is a problem if we want to apply a Friedman-Dragalin-like translation in IL.
But it is not problem if we only want to apply a Friedman-Dragalin-like translation
after a negative translation into ML (not just into IL).
Proposition 11 (factorisations N2 = FD ◦G and N2 = FD
′ ◦G).
1. For all formulas A we have ML ⊢ AN2 ↔ (AG)FD .
2. For all formulas A we have AN2 ≡ (AG)FD
′
.
Proof.
1. Let us abbreviate (AG)FD by AGFD . First we recall the definition of G writing
all negations ¬A in the form A→ ⊥:
PG :≡ (P → ⊥)→ ⊥ (P 6≡ ⊥ atomic),
⊥G :≡ ⊥,
(A ∧B)G :≡ AG ∧BG,
(A ∨B)G :≡ (AG → ⊥) ∧ (BG → ⊥)→ ⊥,
(A→ B)G :≡ AG → BG,
(∀xA)G :≡ ∀xAG,
(∃xA)G :≡ ∃x(AG → ⊥)→ ⊥.
12
Using this we unfold N2 and GFD by induction on the structure of formulas:
PN2 :≡ (P → F )→ F (P 6≡ ⊥ atomic),
⊥N2 :≡ F,
(A ∧B)N2 :≡ AN2 ∧ BN2,
(A ∨B)N2 :≡ (AN2 → F ) ∧ (BN2 → F )→ F,
(A→ B)N2 :≡ AN2 → BN2 ,
(∀xA)N2 :≡ ∀xAN2 ,
(∃xA)N2 :≡ ∃x(AN2 → F )→ F,
PGFD :≡ (P ∨ F → F )→ F (P 6≡ ⊥ atomic),
⊥GFD :≡ F,
(A ∧B)GFD :≡ AGFD ∧BGFD ,
(A ∨B)GFD :≡ (AGFD → F ) ∧ (BGFD → F )→ F,
(A→ B)GFD :≡ AGFD → BGFD ,
(∀xA)GFD :≡ ∀xAGFD ,
(∃xA)GFD :≡ ∃x(AGFD → F )→ F.
Now we prove ML ⊢ AN2 ↔ AGFD by induction on the structure of formulas.
The only non-trivial case is the one of atomic formulas P 6≡ ⊥. In this case
we argue ML ⊢ PN2 ↔ PGFD using ML ⊢ (P → F )↔ (P ∨ F → F ).
2. Just note that AN2 and (AG)FD
′
are both syntactically equal to AG[F/⊥]: we
have we have AN2 ≡ AG[F/⊥] by definition of N2 and we have (A
G)FD
′
≡
AG[F/⊥] by definition of FD ′.
5 Characterisation of the negative translations in-
tuitionistically equivalent to the usual ones
There are two properties relative to NF that the usual negative translations share:
• to translate into NF in IL;
• to act as the identity on NF in IL.
We show that these two properties are not shared by N1 and N2.
Proposition 12. If CL ⊢ ¬F but IL 0 ¬F , then N1 and N2:
1. do not translate into NF in IL;
2. do not act as the identity on NF in IL.
Proof. We do the proof only for N1 since the case of N2 is analogous. By direct
proof, assume CL ⊢ ¬F but IL 0 ¬F and let us prove points 1 and 2.
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1. If N1 would translate into NF in IL, then ⊥
N1 ≡ ⊥∨ F , which is equivalent in
IL to F , would be equivalent in IL to a formula in NF, contradicting point 2 of
lemma 7.
2. If N1 would act as the identity on NF in IL, then IL ⊢ ⊥
N1 ↔ ⊥ (since ⊥ ∈ NF)
where ⊥N1 ≡ ⊥ ∨ F , so IL ⊢ ¬F , contradicting the assumption IL 0 ¬F .
Proposition 12 suggests that the two properties relative to NF may tell the differ-
ence between the usual negative translations into IL and other negative translations
into IL. Indeed, now we prove that they characterise the usual negative translations
into IL.
Theorem 13. Let N be a negative translation into IL (ML). The following properties
are equivalent.
1. N is equivalent in IL (respectively, ML) to G.
2. N translates into NF in IL (respectively, ML).
3. N acts as the identity on NF in IL (respectively, ML).
Proof. We do the proof only for negative translations into IL since the case of neg-
ative translations into ML is analogous.
(1⇒ 2) By direct proof, if N is equivalent in IL to G, then N translates into NF in
IL because G does so, as we wanted.
(2⇒ 3) By direct proof, assume that N translates into NF in IL, consider an arbi-
trary formula A ∈ NF and let us prove IL ⊢ AN ↔ A. By assumption the
formula AN is equivalent in IL to a formula in NF, and we have A ∈ NF,
so the formula AN ↔ A is equivalent in IL to a formula in NF. Since
CL ⊢ AN ↔ A by the characterisation theorem of N , and since CL is con-
servative over IL with respect to NF, we have IL ⊢ AN ↔ A, as we wanted.
(3⇒ 1) By direct proof, assume that N acts as the identity on NF in IL, consider
an arbitrary formula A and let us prove IL ⊢ AN ↔ AG. By the character-
isation theorem of G we have CL + A ⊢ AG and CL + AG ⊢ A. So by the
soundness theorem into IL of N we get IL+AN ⊢ AGN and IL+AGN ⊢ AN
(where AGN abbreviates (AG)N). Therefore by the deduction theorem of
IL we have (1) IL ⊢ AN ↔ AGN . Since AG ∈ NF by a property of G, by
the assumption we have (2) IL ⊢ AGN ↔ AG. From (1) and (2) we get
IL ⊢ AN ↔ AG, as we wanted.
Another property shared by the usual negative translations into IL is idempotence
in IL, that is N ◦ N = N in the sense of: IL ⊢ (AN)N ↔ AN for all formulas A.
Idempotence in IL is sometimes proved using the properties relative to NF. The proof
roughly proceeds like this: if N is a negative translation into IL that (1) translates
into NF in IL and (2) acts as the identity on NF in IL, then AN ∈ NF by (1), so
IL ⊢ (AN)N ↔ AN by (2). (This argument is not rigorous since from (1) we only get
that AN is equivalent in IL to a formula in NF, not that AN ∈ NF.) This relation
of idempotence in IL with the properties relative to NF can make us suspect that
idempotence in IL also characterises the usual negative translations into IL. But
this is not so because, as we will show now, all negative translations into IL are
idempotent in IL (but not equivalent in IL, as we already saw).
Definition 14. Let N be a negative translation into IL. We say thatN is idempotent
in IL (ML) if and only if for all formulas A we have IL ⊢ (AN)N ↔ AN (respectively,
ML ⊢ (AN )N ↔ AN).
Proposition 15. All negative translations into IL (ML) are idempotent in IL (re-
spectively, ML).
Proof. We do the proof only for negative translations into IL since the case of neg-
ative translations into ML is analogous.
Consider an arbitrary negative translation N into IL, an arbitrary formula A
and let us prove IL ⊢ (AN)N ↔ AN . By the characterisation theorem of N we have
CL + AN ⊢ A and CL + A ⊢ AN . So by the soundness theorem into IL of N we get
IL + (AN )N ⊢ AN and IL + AN ⊢ (AN )N . Then by the deduction theorem of IL we
have IL ⊢ (AN)N ↔ AN , as we wanted.
6 Conclusion
The main three points of this article are the following.
Conjecture The fact that the usual negative translations into IL are equivalent
in IL leads to the conjecture: if we rigorously define the notion
of a negative translation into IL, then we should be able to prove
that all negative translations are equivalent in IL.
Refutation We refuted the conjecture by presenting two counterexamples.
Characterisation We characterised the usual negative translations into IL as being
the ones that translate into NF in IL, or equivalently, that act as
the identity on NF in IL.
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